Could a German-Dutch-Polish military corridor kickstart a European ‘military Schengen’?

In late January, an agreement was signed by Germany, the Netherlands and Poland to establish a military transport corridor among them, providing a significant boost to the often-discussed yet seldom pursued goal of enhancing military mobility across Europe. The countries stated that this corridor signifies a tangible step toward a genuine military version of the Schengen agreement.

The facts

The concept of creating a military Schengen, aligning with the visa-free movement of people and goods within the Schengen area, has been proposed by European decision-makers in the past. However, the recent agreement indicates a growing momentum behind this idea.

The notion of a military Schengen initially emerged in response to Russia’s annexation of Crimea. A decade after the annexation and two years into the ongoing war in Ukraine, Europe is recognizing the need to prepare for the possibility that Russian President Vladimir Putin may extend military actions further west. European military officials are drawing on Cold War experiences, including lessons on military mobility, to better anticipate and address potential challenges.

Nevertheless, according to various experts and diplomats, progress toward the desired objectives is considerably slower than anticipated. Tomasz Szatkowski, Poland’s permanent representative to NATO, underlined that while there is general approval for liberalizing the rules, discussions on this matter have been ongoing since 2015. Europe has acknowledged the potential resurgence of Cold War-era tensions and recognizes that there is still a substantial distance to cover in efficiently transporting personnel and materials.

The arguments

The transit of any item related to a military mission in Europe faces numerous challenges, ranging from bureaucratic obstacles to infrastructure deficiencies, leading to critical delays. Urmas Paet, an MEP from Estonia and vice-chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, rated military mobility at 3 out of 10, highlighting that it currently takes weeks or even more than a week to send supplies to the Baltic states.

Bureaucracy proves to be a significant hindrance, as multiple approvals are required from various ministries across different countries and regions. Many roads and bridges were originally designed for civilian use and may not withstand the weight of heavy military equipment. The absence of a fuel pipeline extending to the eastern states from central Europe could result in prolonged delays in fuel supply, playing a pivotal role in decision-making. Additionally, the difference in railway gauge sizes between former Soviet states and European railways poses a challenge, making the transfer of troops and equipment between trains more complex and time-consuming in a wartime scenario.

General Ben Hodges, an early advocate of a “military Schengen” and former NATO commander, noted a positive development in recent years with resumed talks. “Now I hear ministers talking about it,” he mentioned during the recent Munich Security Conference. Hodges underscored the crucial role of quick mobility in a crisis, considering it an integral aspect of military deterrence doctrine. He stated that the visible capacity of an armed force to swiftly mobilize serves as a deterrent, dissuading potential adversaries from initiating an attack.

Hodges commended the agreement among Germany, the Netherlands, and Poland as a promising initial step, noting that discussions about numerous additional corridors were underway. Bulgarian Defense Chief Admiral Emil Eftimov suggested prioritizing corridors from Alexandroupolis in Greece to Romania and another from the Adriatic Sea through Albania and North Macedonia. Hodges expressed that the objective of these corridors is to establish seamless routes with efficient infrastructure, pre-emptively addressing customs and legal obstacles.

The German-Dutch-Polish corridor, being the first of many planned, is anticipated to identify and resolve bottlenecks, potentially serving as a model for future corridors. During peacetime, it would facilitate the streamlining of federal processes, especially in Germany, where each federal state (Länder) has its own set of laws governing the transit of troops or hazardous equipment. In times of war, the corridor would transcend its role as a mere road. During a crisis, a significant number of soldiers, possibly a hundred thousand or more, would be on the move. This necessitates provisions for rest stops, access to spare parts depots, and fuel storage centers. Additionally, arrangements would be required to address the needs of war refugees in such a scenario.

Addressing this requirement becomes particularly challenging when involving more than three nations. Cooperation among over two dozen member states, especially when it entails armed personnel and hazardous equipment, is hindered by numerous regulations.

Defence is national competence in the EU

In the European Union, defence is considered “a national competence,” and countries are selective in sharing information, particularly about critical infrastructure details, such as the classification of bridges for military transport and their capacity to support the weight of tanks.

Rafael Loss, a defence expert at the European Council on Foreign Relations think tank, highlighted the absence of a catalogue outlining infrastructure needs.

He stated that it is not clear what kind of infrastructure is needed and where. Only 90% of motorways, 75% of national roads, and 40% of bridges in Europe are capable of accommodating vehicles with a military-classified maximum load of 50 tonnes. However, tanks like the Leopard and Abrams, both proven effective in the Ukrainian conflict, weigh significantly more.

Recognizing the need for dual-use infrastructure, serving both civil and military purposes, the EU has approved funding for 95 such projects. However, there are concerns raised by the Polish ambassador and Hodges regarding the reduction in funding for the EU’s infrastructure financing tool, the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF), from €6.5 billion to €1.7 billion.

Rail Baltica, a transnational railway project funded through the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF), aims to expand Europe’s rail network to the Baltic states of Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia, with plans for it to be operational by 2030.

However, concerns about funding have been reported by local news outlets. Moreover, there is strong resistance from countries like France, Belgium, and even Germany to invest in extending the central European pipeline to eastern nations, which often allocate a larger portion of their GDP to Europe’s collective defence compared to the larger economies on the continent.

Pushing all 27 EU and over 30 NATO members toward a consensus can be challenging, but there are reasons for optimism, stemming from the latest NATO summit in Vilnius, Lithuania.

Last July, NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg announced three regional defence plans, the first since the end of the Cold War. He stated that NATO would plan and reinforce deterrence in the Atlantic and the European Arctic region in the north, the Baltic and Central European region in the center, and the Mediterranean and the Black Sea in the south.

These plans allow NATO members to assess specific defence requirements, allocate them among different allies, and, in the process, understand specific logistical needs.